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Abstract
We interpret multi-product supply chains (SCs) as coordinated markets; under this interpre-
tation, a SC optimization problem is a market clearing problem that allocates resources and as-
sociated economic values (prices) to different stakeholders that bid into the market (suppliers,
consumers, transportation, and processing technologies). The market interpretation allows us to
establish fundamental properties that explain how physical resources (primal variables) and asso-
ciated economic values (dual variables) flow in the SC. We use duality theory to explain why in-
centivizing markets by forcing stakeholder participation (e.g., by imposing demand satisfaction or
service provision constraints) yields artificial price behavior, inefficient allocations, and economic
losses. To overcome these issues, we explore market incentive mechanisms that use bids; here, we
introduce the concept of a stakeholder graph (a product-based representation of a supply chain)
and show that this representation allows us to naturally determine minimum bids that activate
the market. These results provide guidelines to design SC formulations that properly remunerate
stakeholders and to design policy that foster market transactions. The results are illustrated using
an urban waste management problem for a city of 100,000 residents.
Keywords: supply chains, coordinated markets, multi-product, waste management, incentives.
1 Introduction
Supply chain (SC) optimization is an essential industrial task that has seen significant research in
recent years. In a multi-product supply chain setting, raw materials are transported to processing
sites to create valude-added products and these products are in turn transported to final customers.
The tenet of most existing SC models is that there exists a central entity that coordinates all assets in the
supply chain (supply, consumption, transportation, and processing) in order to maximize total profit.
In other words, the SC problem is interpreted as a central planning problem [22]. The implication of
this setting is that the central planner dictates the allocation (distribution) of resources and associated
economic value among assets. We direct the interested reader to several comprehensive reviews on
the topic [17, 11, 4, 21].
An alternative interpretation of a SC is one in which assets are owned by independent stakehold-
ers that seek to strategically optimize their individual profits. Recently, we have observed that this
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interpretation matches that of a coordinated market [25]. There is a rich body of literature concern-
ing the use of coordinated markets for power systems [7, 8, 14, 23, 33]. In fact, most modern power
networks are managed using coordinated markets. In such markets, stakeholders submit bids for
power supply and consumption and for transportation (transmission) services to a non-profit entity
known as the independent system operator (ISO). The ISO uses the bidding information to solve a
network optimization problem (known as the market clearing problem) that determines power sup-
ply, demand, and transmission allocations that maximize the social welfare and that satisfy capacity
constraints and network balance constraints (supply and demand matches at each location). Impor-
tantly, the market clearing problem has an equivalent dual representation that reveals the inherit
value of power (clearing prices) at every network location. We thus have that the standard represen-
tation of the clearing problem (known as the primal representation) determines physical allocations
while the dual representation determines economic allocations. An important result is that the primal-
dual allocations obtained from the clearing problem correspond to those of a competitive equilibrium
in which stakeholders maximize their individual profits. Importantly, this equilibrium is reached in-
stantenously by the market clearing procedure; in a non-coordinated market, equilibrium is reached
progressively over time (by peer-to-peer transactions). This desirable coordination behavior can help
the market quickly respond to externalities (e.g., extreme weather or shortages of supplies). For in-
stance, in the power grid, the coordination mechanism is essential to respond to extreme weather
events and fluctuations of renewable power. The primal-dual allocations obtained from a coordi-
nated market are also such that no stakeholder loses money and such that revenue is balanced in the
system (financial gains of suppliers and service providers match financial payments of consumers).
Sampat and co-workers recently generalized coordinated market formulations to account for multi-
ple products, processing technologies, and transportation options [25]. This work revealed that it is
possible to construct multi-product SC models that inherit desirable economic properties of coordi-
nated markets.
In this work, we exploit the coordinated market interpretation of SCs to derive new economic
properties that explain how physical and economic resources are created and flow in the SC. Specif-
ically, we propose a product-based representation of the SC (that we call a stakeholder graph) to
analyze how products and associated values flow from suppliers to consumers through intermidi-
ate transportation and transformation steps. We use this representation to derive a procedure to
determine minimum bids that activate a market. This approach can be used by policy makers to
determine appropriate incentives that foster market transactions and investment. We use also du-
ality theory to show that incentivizing markets by forcing stakeholder participation (as is done in
typical SC settings) can induce revenue imbalances in the system, induce arbitrary price behavior,
and can lead to financial losses for some stakeholders. Our results provide guidelines to derive SC
models that induce desired economic behavior and to design proper incentives by policy makers
(e.g., environmental agencies) that foster stakeholder participation. We apply these results to a waste
SC arising from municipal solid waste disposal recycling problem. In this problem, the local gov-
ernment is interested in diverting waste from the landfill to recycling facilities [18, 34, 29]. To this
end, the proposed SC model has available material recycling facilities that offer a more expensive
(but sustainable) means of waste disposal. We use our developments to determine bidding prices
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for recycled materials that are necessary to activate and sustain a recycling market and discuss the
implications for policy makers.
2 Multi-Product Supply Chains as Coordinated Markets
We represent a multi-product SC comprising a collection of independent stakeholders as a coordi-
nated market. Market coordination brings together potential buyers (consumers) and sellers (sup-
pliers) to resolve transactions in an efficient and competitive manner. Buyers and sellers make their
monetary valuations of products (bids) known to the ISO who resolves transactions by solving a
market clearing problem. Importantly, the only interest of the ISO in the market is the creation and
balancing of economic value; the ISO only coordinates transactions and does not interfere with the
objectives of buyers and sellers. In the case of consumers, a bid is the highest price that a consumer is
willing to pay to receive a product. Sellers and service providers submit bids representing the lowest
price at which they are willing to provide a product or service [26, 25]. An important aspect of the
clearing problem is that transactions between consumers and suppliers do not occur if bids do not
generate wealth in the market, a property referred to as revenue adequacy. In simple settings, rev-
enue adequacy implies that a consumer bid must be greater than the corresponding bid of a supplier
for a transaction to occur. When no transactions occur, the market is said to be dry.
In more realistic settings, product transportation within the SC and product transformation tech-
nologies are modeled under their own stakeholder classes. An SC is thus a collection of suppliers,
transportation services, processing services, and consumers. In such a setting, it is expected that
market transactions occur if a consumer bid for a given product “beats” the collective bids of sup-
pliers, transportation, and transformation involved in the pathway that generates that product (i.e.,
the value of the product needs to be higher than the costs associated with supplies, transport, and
processing involved in its creation). Establishing exact relationships a general SC setting is challeng-
ing and is the subject of this work. We also highlight that bids should provide natural incentives for
stakeholders to participate (or not) in the market. In other words, forcing stakeholder participation
(e.g., by using supply and service provision constraints) is not allowed in the market. We will see in
Section 3 that forcing participation can destroy desirable economic properties of a market.
We now present notation for the market clearing problem: SC stakeholders represented in the
market are suppliers (denoted by i ∈ S), consumers or demands (denoted by j ∈ D), transportation
providers (denoted by l ∈ L), and transformation (processing) providers (denoted by t ∈ T ). The
products exchanged in the system are indexed p ∈ P and the set of geographical nodes in the SC graph
are n ∈ N . To enable compact notation, the indices are always associated with the corresponding
sets. The connections between nodes define the supply chain graph, which is a graph (a network) that
connects stakeholders. We assume that the SC graph is fully connected (i.e., there exists a path from
each node n ∈ N to every other n′ ∈ N ). An important observation is that the SC graph uses a node-
based representation (stakeholders are associated with specific nodes). Later we will see that there is
an alternative (product-based) representation of the SC in which that captures how stakeholders are
connected via products and how products and associated economic values flow in the system.
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Suppliers i ∈ S each have a physical supply variable (flow) si ∈ R+, a bid capacity si ∈ R+, a bid
cost αsi ∈ R, and attributes n(i) ∈ N , p(i) ∈ P which indicate the associated node and product of the
supplier. The supply bid cost is the cost at which the supplier offers product and is often related to
its marginal supply cost. The supply bid capacity is the maximum flow of product that it can offer.
Note that the supply bid cost can be positive or negative. When the bid cost is positive (standard),
the supplier expects the market to pay for its product. When the bid cost is negative, the supplier
is willing to pay for the market to take away its product, this situation can arise when the product
generates a financial loss (e.g., the supplier has excess product or generates a local environment
impact). For instance, a city is a supplier that offers to pay the market (negative bid) for taking its
waste.
Each consumer j ∈ D has a physical demand variable dj ∈ R+, a bid capacity dj ∈ R+, a bid cost
denoted αdj ∈ R, and set attributes n(j) ∈ N , p(j) ∈ P indicating its location and desired product.
The demand bid cost is the cost that consumer is willing to pay for a product and the capacity is the
maximum flow that it can take. A positive bid cost (standard), indicates that the consumer is willing
to pay to the market to obtain product. When the bid cost is negative, the consumer expects to be
paid in order to take a product, this situation arises when taking product generates a financial loss for
the consumer (e.g., an environmental impact). For instance, a landfill is a consumer that requests a
payment from the market (negative bid) for taking waste. Consumers with negative bids can also be
used to capture policy makers (that represent society of the environment). For instance, a consumer
that represents a lake can charge the market if a product (e.g., wastewater) is discharged in it.
We define the nested sets Sn,p ⊆ Sn ⊆ S where Sn := {i|n(i) = n} and Sn,p := {i|n(i) = n, p(i) =
p}. The set Sn includes all suppliers i located at a node n; the set Sn,p refines inclusion to suppliers
of a product p at a node n. Following a similar logic, we define the nested sets Dn,p ⊆ Dn ⊆ D
with Dn := {j|n(j) = n} and Dn,p := {j|n(j) = n, p(j) = p}. This notation allows us to categorize
suppliers and consumers by product and location.
Transport providers l ∈ L each possesses a physical flow variable fl ∈ R+, a bid capacity f l ∈ R+,
a bid cost αfl ∈ R+, and attributes ns(l) ∈ N (its source node) nr(l) ∈ N (its receiving node) and
p(l) ∈ P representing the product it will move. The bid cost is the cost that the provider charges
for its service; the bid cost is assumed here to be positive because it is rare to encounter situations
in which it is negative (although mathematically this is possible). We will see that positive transport
costs are necessary to prevent inefficient “cycling” behavior (inefficient use of transport). We apply
similar nesting to transport providers L and extend the sets to capture transport direction. We define
Linn,p ⊆ Linn ⊆ L and Loutn,p ⊆ Loutn ⊆ L to differentiate inbound and outbound transport from a node,
where Linn := {l|nr(l) = n} and Loutn := {l|ns(l) = n}, and Linn,p := {l|nr(l) = n, p(l) = p} and
Loutn,p := {l|ns(l) = n, p(l) = p}.
Technology providers t ∈ T have physical variables ct ∈ R+ and gt ∈ R+, representing product
consumption and generation, respectively. Each t ∈ T also has bid capacities ct ∈ R+ and gt ∈ R+,
and bid cost αct ∈ R+. The processing bid cost is the cost that the provider charges for providing
processing services (e.g., operating costs for a technology). We will see that negative bid costs can
induce inefficient use of technologies. Technology attributes include a node n(t) ∈ N , a set of input
products Pcont ⊆ P to the technology, and a set of output products Pgent ⊆ P generated by the
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technology. In other words, the technology can take multiple inputs to generate multiple outputs
(e.g., a recycling facility or a waste-to-fuels facility). We use technology inputs and outputs to define
the nested sets T conn,p ⊆ Tn ⊆ T and T genn,p ⊆ Tn ⊆ T where Tn := {t|n(t) = n}, T conn,p := {t|n(t) =
n, p(t) ∈ Pcont } and T genn,p := {t|n(t) = n, p(t) ∈ Pgent } such that technologies may be differentiated by
their input and output product attributes. We select a product p¯ ∈ Pcont as the reference product for
technology t. Yield coefficients γt,p ∈ R+, p ∈ {Pcont ,Pgent } are defined with respect to this reference
product, and γt,p¯ = 1. This structuring of technology providers defines product consumption and
generation rates relative to the reference product. Bids for processing providers are defined with
respect to this reference product; the notation αct indicates that bids are made with respect to their
consumption (processing) rates. We note that all supply, demand, transport, and processing flows
are positive (because these are physical flows).
2.1 Market Clearing Problem
The ISO uses stakeholder bidding information (αs, αd, αf , αc) and capacities (s, d, c, f) to solve an
optimization problem that is known as the market clearing problem. The goal of the clearing problem
is to allocate physical resources and associated economic values to the stakeholders in the system.
It is important to emphasize that the mathematical formulation of the clearing problem defines how
economic value is generated and distributed among the stakeholders and thus must be designed with
care. Deriving proper clearing formulations is the central topic of market design.
The objective of the market clearing problem that we propose is given by (2.1a). The objective
seeks to find physical allocations (s, d, f, c, g) for all involved stakeholders that maximize the social
welfare. Fundamentally, maximizing the social welfare seeks to maximize the balance between value
(positive terms) with costs (negative terms). If all the bids are positive, maximizing the social welfare
seeks to maximize demand served to consumers while minimizing supply, transport, and processing
costs.
max
s,d,f,c,g
∑
j∈D
αdjdj −
∑
i∈S
αsi si −
∑
l∈L
αfl fl −
∑
t∈T conn,p¯
αctct (2.1a)
We note that the social welfare indicates that priority will be given to consumers with large bid costs
and suppliers and service providers with low bid costs. However, the allocations need to satisfy a
number of constraints associated with physical conservation and capacity. To define such constraints,
we define the total nodal and product supply and demand allocations on the SC graph as:
sn,p =
∑
i∈Sn,p
si, (n, p) ∈ N × P, (pisupn,p ) (2.1b)
dn,p =
∑
j∈Dn,p
dj , (n, p) ∈ N × P, (pidemn,p ) (2.1c)
Here, the notation si and dj is is short-hand notation for sn(i),p(i) and dn(j),p(j) (mapping of stakehold-
ers onto the SC graph). The variable sn,p ∈ R+ is the total supply flow injected at a given node and for
a given product. The variable dn,p ∈ R+ is the total demand flow withdrawn from a given node and
for a given product. These definitions capture the fact that multiple stakeholders i ∈ S or j ∈ D can
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bid for the same product or from the same location. We also define the dual variables corresponding
to these constraints as pisupn,p ∈ R and pidemn,p ∈ R.
Physical conservation within the model is provided by:
sn,p +
∑
l∈Linn,p
fl +
∑
t∈T genn,p
gt = dn,p +
∑
l∈Loutn,p
fl +
∑
t∈T conn,p
ct, (n, p) ∈ N × P, (pibaln,p) (2.1d)
In a market context, these conservation constraints are referred to as the clearing constraints. From
the perspective of a SC, these are known as nodal product balances. These constraints ensure that
incoming supply, transport flows, and generated flows for a given product and node equal demand
served, outgoing transportation, and product consumption. The dual variables of these constraints
are defined as pibaln,p ∈ R. In Section 2.2 we will demonstrate that these dual variables represent nodal
market clearing prices and play an important role in defining economic value for products at different
locations and in determining how stakeholders are charged or remunerated.
Constraint (2.1e) defines product transformation (conversion) relationships for the processing
technologies. Product transformations are expressed as linear equations with yield parameters γt,p ∈
R+ for each product involved. The dual variable to (2.1e) is picont,n,p,p′ ∈ R.
γt,p′gt,n(t),p(t) = γt,pct,n(t),p′(t), (t, n, p, p
′) ∈ T ×N × Pgent × Pcont , (picont,n,p,p′) (2.1e)
Equations (2.1f) to (2.1l) provide bounds for stakeholder allocations (maximum flows they can
provide or take). Nodal supply and demand capacities sn,p ∈ R+ and dn,p ∈ R+ are derived from si
and dj and are equivalent. The dual variables for each of the upper bounding constraints are defined
as λi ∈ R+, λj ∈ R+, λdn,p ∈ R+, λsn,p ∈ R+, λl ∈ R+, λct ∈ R+, and λgt ∈ R+.
si ≤ si, i ∈ S, (λi) (2.1f)
dj ≤ dj , j ∈ D, (λj) (2.1g)
dn,p ≤ dn,p, (n, p) ∈ N × P, (λdn,p) (2.1h)
sn,p ≤ sn,p, (n, p) ∈ N × P, (λsn,p) (2.1i)
fl ≤ f l, (l) ∈ L, (λl) (2.1j)
ct ≤ ct, (t) ∈ T , (λct) (2.1k)
gt ≤ gt, (t) ∈ T , (λgt ) (2.1l)
In summary, the market clearing model is given by the set of equations (2.1) and seeks allocations
that maximize the social welfare and satisfy conservation and capacity constraints. We also highlight
the presence of dual variables (also known as hidden or shadow variables); in typical SC settings
these variables are ignored, but in a market interpretation these play a key role in establishing eco-
nomic values for products and services and dictate stakeholder remuneration.
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2.2 Economic Properties of Bids, Prices, and Profits
In this section we will see that bidding information provided to the ISO (bid costs and capacities)
define the feasible space for market clearing allocations (s, d, f, c, g) and prices pibaln,p. This is of interest
because clearing prices and physical allocations represent charges to consumers and remuneration
for suppliers, transporters, and technology providers.
The dual variables pibaln,p are indexed by SC node n ∈ N and product p ∈ P (they represent the
value of a product p at a node n); accordingly, they are also referred to as nodal prices. These nodal
prices represent the economic value of products at specific geographical locations. The following
relationships define short-hand notation for prices (as done for allocations):
pii := pi
bal
n(i),p(i), i ∈ S (2.2a)
pij := pi
bal
n(j),p(j), j ∈ D (2.2b)
Geographical differences between nodal prices capture the economic value of product transportation
and these are defined as:
pil := pi
bal
n′(l),p(l) − pibaln(l),p(l), l ∈ L (2.2c)
We define the economic value of product transformation, which is given by the difference between
the prices of products consumed and generated by a technology (weighted by yield coefficients γt,p):
pit :=
∑
p∈Pgent
γt,ppi
bal
n(t),p −
∑
p′∈Pcont
γt,p′pi
bal
n(t),p′ , t ∈ T (2.2d)
We denote the entire set of market clearing prices pi = (pii, pij , pil, pit); this shorthand notation allows
us to associate economic values and profits with stakeholders in an intuitive way.
In the proposed setting, αdjdj is the economic value of its bid allocation and pijdj is its remunera-
tion from the market. The consumer thus has an incentive to participate in the market (buy product)
if αdj > pij (the value provided by the product is higher than what it pays for). For suppliers we have
that αsi si is the value of the supplied product (interpreted as a marginal or operating cost) and receive
piisi in revenue from the market. Suppliers are thus motivated to sell product to the market if pii > αsi .
Using a similar logic, transportation and technology providers have operating costs of αfl fl and α
c
tct
and they receive pilfl and pitct in revenue accordingly from the market. Specifically, these players are
motivated to provide services to the market if pil > α
f
l and pit > α
c
t . Following this logic, we define
the stakeholder profits as:
φsi (pii, α
s
i , si) = (pii − αsi )si, i ∈ S (2.3a)
φdj (pij , α
d
j , dj) = (α
d
j − pij)dj , j ∈ D (2.3b)
φfl (pil, α
f
l , fl) = (pil − αfl )fl, l ∈ L (2.3c)
φct(pit, α
c
t , ct) = (pit − αct)ct, t ∈ T (2.3d)
Intuitively, players have an incentive to participate in the market if their profits are positive, are
ambivalent if they are zero, and do not have an incentive if they are negative. Accordingly, we want to
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ensure that the market clearing formulation delivers allocations and clearing prices that lead to non-
negative profits (otherwise, the market does not provide a viable environment for the stakeholders).
We use φ = (φsi , φ
d
j , φ
f
l , φ
c
t) as shorthand notation for all profits.
We now show that Lagrangian dual of the market clearing model indicates that pricing and profit
definitions emerge naturally. The Lagrangian dual problem is defined as:
max
pi
min
s,d,f,c,g
L(s, d, f, c, g, pi). (2.4)
The Lagrange function is constructed in (2.5), and contains the supply and demand geographical
mapping constraints, the market clearing constraint, and the conversion constraint which are all
raised into the Lagrangian function with their appropriate dual variables.
L(s, d, f, c, g, pi) = −
∑
j∈D
αdjdj +
∑
i∈S
αsi si +
∑
l∈L
αfl fl +
∑
t∈T conn,p
αctct
+
∑
n∈N
∑
p∈P
pisupn,p
 ∑
i∈Sn,p
si − sn,p
+ ∑
n∈N
∑
p∈P
pidemn,p
dn,p − ∑
j∈Dn,p
dj

+
∑
n∈N
∑
p∈P
pibaln,p
dn,p + ∑
l∈Loutn,p
fl +
∑
t∈T conn,p
ct − sn,p −
∑
l∈Linn,p
fl −
∑
t∈T genn,p
gt

+
∑
t∈T
∑
n∈N
∑
p′∈Pcont
∑
p∈Pgent
picont,n,p,p′
(
γt,pct,n(t),p′(t) − γt,p′gt,n(t),p(t)
)
(2.5)
The market clearing formulation is linear and thus satisfies strong duality [5]. Strong duality indicates
that a solution of the Lagrangian dual problem is also a solution of the primal formulation).
The Lagrange function can be simplified by using the following identities:∑
n∈N
∑
p∈P
pibaln,p
∑
i∈Sn,p
si =
∑
i∈S
piisi, (2.6a)
∑
n∈N
∑
p∈P
pibaln,p
∑
j∈Dn,p
dj =
∑
j∈D
pijdj , (2.6b)
∑
n∈N
∑
p∈P
pibaln,p
 ∑
l∈Linn,p
fl −
∑
l∈Loutn,p
fl
 = ∑
l∈L
(
pibaln′(l),p(l) − pibaln(l),p(l)
)
fn(l),n′(l),p(l)
=
∑
l∈L
pilfl
(2.6c)
and,
∑
n∈N
∑
p∈P
pibaln,p
 ∑
t∈T genn,p
gt,n,p −
∑
t∈T conn,p
ct,n,p
 = ∑
n∈N
∑
p∈P
pibaln,p
 ∑
t∈T genn,p
γt,pct,n,p¯ −
∑
t∈T conn,p
γt,pct,n,p¯

=
∑
t∈T
pitct,n(t),p¯(t)
(2.6d)
The technology price identity makes use of yield factor definitions to rewrite the expression solely in
terms of the reference product p¯(t).
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We observe that terms associated with the dual variables pisupn,p , pidemn,p , and picont,n,p,p′ each add to zero
and thus cancel out of the Lagrange function. Applying the price identities to the remaining terms
leads to (2.7). This analysis allows us to express the Lagrangian solely in terms of stakeholder profits
and indicates that the Lagrangian dual minimizes negative profits (maximizes profits).
L(s, d, f, c, g, pi) =−
∑
j∈D
αdjdj +
∑
i∈S
αsi si +
∑
l∈L
αfl fl +
∑
t∈T
αctct,n(t),p¯(t)
+
∑
j∈D
pijdj −
∑
i∈S
piisi −
∑
l∈L
pilfl −
∑
t∈T
pitct,n(t),p¯(t)
=−
∑
j∈D
φdj +
∑
i∈S
φsi +
∑
l∈L
φfl +
∑
t∈T
φct

(2.7)
2.3 Dual of Market Clearing Problem
The dual formulation to the clearing model provides additional insight (not obvious from the La-
grangian dual) on economic properties that emerge from the clearing procedure. We first note that
it is possible to condense the primal clearing formulation (2.1) by incorporating the conversion con-
straints directly into the market clearing constraints, and writing the model exclusively in terms of
stakeholder-indexed supply and demand volumes. The condensed model also replaces the variables
ct and gt with a single technology flow variable ξt ∈ R+ with the same attributes. The condensed
primal clearing formulation is given by (2.8).
max
s,d,f,ξ
∑
j∈D
αdjdj −
∑
i∈S
αsi si −
∑
l∈L
αfl fl −
∑
t∈T
αξt ξt (2.8a)
s.t.
∑
i∈Sn,p
si +
∑
l∈Linn
fl +
∑
t∈T genn,p
γt,pξt =
∑
j∈Dn,p
dj +
∑
l∈Loutn
fl +
∑
t∈T conn,p
γt,pξt, (n, p) ∈ N × P, (pibaln,p)
(2.8b)
si ≤ si, i ∈ S, (λi) (2.8c)
dj ≤ dj , j ∈ D, (λj) (2.8d)
fl ≤ f l, l ∈ L, (λl) (2.8e)
ξt ≤ ξt, t ∈ T , (λt) (2.8f)
The corresponding condensed dual of the condensed formulation is given by (2.9). The dual objec-
tive is presented in (2.9a); this function contains only the dual variables corresponding to the capacity
constraints of (2.1). This provides some intuition regarding dual behavior; the dual objective min-
imizes capacity constraint margins. In other words, it seeks to extract as much capacity from the
players as possible. How these margins relate to market prices and bid costs is defined by the dual
constraints.
min
pi,λ
∑
i∈S
siλi +
∑
j∈D
djλj +
∑
l∈L
f lλl +
∑
t∈T
ξtλt (2.9a)
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pibaln(i),p(i) − λi ≥ αsi , i ∈ S (2.9b)
pibaln(j),p(j) + λj ≤ αdj , j ∈ D (2.9c)
pibaln(l),p(l) − pibaln′(l),p(l) − λn(l),n′(l),p(l) ≥ αfl , l ∈ L (2.9d)∑
p∈Pgent
γt,ppi
bal
n(t),p(t) −
∑
p∈Pcont
γt,ppi
bal
n(t),p(t) − λt ≥ αξt , t ∈ T (2.9e)
The dual problem reveals the same important pricing properties as determined using the Lagrangian
dual. Rewriting the dual constraints in the compact form (2.10) (with pii and pij representing nodal
prices for suppliers and consumers, pil for transportation prices, and pit for technology prices) gives:
pii − λi ≥ αsi , i ∈ S (2.10a)
pij + λj ≤ αdj , j ∈ D (2.10b)
pil − λl ≥ αfl , l ∈ L (2.10c)
pit − λt ≥ αξt , t ∈ T (2.10d)
The dual thus captures price relationships to bids and indicate that market prices are not allowed to
exceed consumer bids nor fall below supplier, transporter, and technology bids (recall that the duals
λ are non-negative). The presence of λ in each relationship implies that price values are related to
whether or not market demands are fully served under the interpretation of λ as a marginal price.
Importantly, the arrangement of these λ is such that the bid bounding properties cannot be violated
(i.e., the duals serve to tighten these constraints).
Note that (2.10a) can also be written as:
pii − αsi ≥ λi, i ∈ S
This reveals that pii − αsi ≥ 0 (pii ≥ αsi ); moreover, this indicates minimizing the dual objective
(minimize λi), seeks to widen the gap between the clearing price pii and the supplier bid αsi (and with
this remunerate the stakeholder more). Similar logic can be followed for the other stakeholders.
The dual constraints can be interpreted as economic driving forces. In each of the constraints, a price
value pii, pij , pil, or pit higher than (for suppliers, transportation providers, and technology providers)
or lower than (for consumers) the associated bid value represents a positive profit associated with
the transaction and provides a driving force for that stakeholder to participate in the market. The
price identities help provide some context for these driving forces; a positive transport price pil with
n(l), n′(l), and p(l) implies an economic driving force to move product p from node n to node n′.
A positive technology price pit with product outputs Pgent and product inputs Pcont implies an eco-
nomic driving force to transform the set of products Pcont into the set of products Pgent because the
generated products are worth more than the products consumed (accounting for yield coefficients).
Moreover, these relationships imply that negative profits are not allowed in coordinated markets. In
other words, the clearing procedure delivers allocations such that no stakeholder loses money.
The relationships between the primal and dual formulations are visualized in Figure 1. The pri-
mal formulation of the ISO market clearing problem provides a representation explicitly in terms of
10
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the physical allocations (s, d, f, ξ) while the dual representation is explicit in economic allocations pi.
Using either model formulation, the other half of the solution is obtained from constraint shadow
prices. The correspondence between each primal and dual variable to a constraint in the other for-
mulation is reiterated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Complementary primal and dual views of coordinated market. Suppliers, consumers, trans-
port providers, and technology providers submit bidding information to the ISO, who solves the
clearing problem. The clearing problem maximizes the social welfare (profit) of all stakeholders by
balancing supply and demand, finding efficient transportation routes, and managing product trans-
formations. The primal view of the clearing problem defines physical allocations while the dual view
defines economic allocations. Primal-dual variable correspondence is indicated for each constraint.
2.4 Theoretical Properties of Coordinated Markets
We now exploit the primal-dual properties of the clearing formulation to define fundamental eco-
nomic properties for the market. Each of these has been established in Sampat et. al. [25] and we
sketch the proofs here for completeness. These theorems are provided as a basis for further analysis,
and we thus provide context around each.
Theorem 1. The market delivers prices pi and allocations (s, d, f, c, g) that maximize the collective profits
(φs, φd, φf , φc) and the profits are all nonnegative.
Proof. For some arbitrary and fixed set of prices pi the allocation (s, d, f, c, g) = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0) results in
zero profits φ = (0, 0, 0, 0) for all stakeholders. The Lagrangian (2.7) is the total of negative profits,
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and L(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, pi) = 0. Thus, subject to fixed pi, solving the Lagrangian dual problem produces an
allocation (s, d, f, c, g) that minimizes the Lagrangian function, meaning L(s, d, f, c, g) ≤ 0. Under
fixed pi, solving the Lagrangian is equivalent to maximizing the sum of the stakeholder profits, i.e.,
maximizing stakeholder profits independently, and therefore the allocations (s, d, f, c, g) are at least
as good as (0, 0, 0, 0, 0). It follows that φsi (pii, si) ≥ 0, φdj (pij , dj) ≥ 0, φfl (pil, fl) ≥ 0, and φct(pit, ct) ≥ 0.
Since pi are arbitrary prices, we have that the profits are non-negative for optimal clearing prices and
the corresponding allocations.
Stakeholder profits will be either non-negative if a stakeholder participates in the market, or zero
if it does not. The interpretation here is an important one: formulating a SC as a coordinated market is
sufficient to ensure that every stakeholder is sufficiently remunerated, else some stakeholders refuse
to participate and some part of the market becomes dry.
Theorem 2. The market delivers prices pi and allocations (s, d, f, c, g) that represent a competitive equilibrium.
Proof. Let us choose an arbitrary set of prices pi; minimizing the Lagrange function subject to these
fixed pi produces allocations (s, d, f, c, g) which maximize stakeholder profits independently. The
market clearing program is linear, therefore strong duality holds and the allocations produced by
solving the Lagrangian also solve the primal market clearing problem and satisfies the associated
market clearing constraints.
The above property indicates that coordination does not imply lack of competition and that the
coordination enabled by the bidding process to the ISO does not interfere with the competitive nature
of the market.
Theorem 3. The market delivers prices pi and allocations (s, d, f, x) that lead to revenue adequacy:∑
j∈D
pijdj =
∑
i∈S
piisi +
∑
l∈L
pilfl +
∑
t∈T
pitct
Proof. Consider an optimal set of allocations (s, d, f, c, g) for the market clearing problem; the clearing
constraints hold at optimality, and we have from (2.1d):
sn,p +
∑
l∈Linn
fl +
∑
t∈T genn,p
gt − dn,p −
∑
l∈Loutn
fl −
∑
t∈T conn,p
ct = 0,
Combining this result with the identities defining market prices in (2.6), we express pibaln,p in terms of
prices pii, pij , pil, and pit, and also rewrite technology inputs and outputs in terms of reference products
p¯(t). Altogether, this gives: ∑
i∈S
piisi +
∑
l∈L
pilfl +
∑
t∈T
pitct −
∑
j∈D
pijdj = 0
This recapitulates the revenue adequacy definition; it follows that revenue collected from consumers
is sufficient to make payments to stakeholders.
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Revenue adequacy implies that financial payments provided by consumers are sufficient to cover
the financial payments made to suppliers, transportation providers, and technology providers (there
are no money losses in the market).
Theorem 4. The market clearing prices satisfy the bounds: pii ≥ αSi for all i ∈ S∗, pij ≤ αDj for all j ∈ D∗,
pil ≥ αfl for all l ∈ L∗, and pit ≥ αct for all t ∈ T ∗, where S∗, D∗, T ∗, and L∗ indicate cleared transactions.
Proof. Theorem 1 establishes that profits (φs, φd, φf , φc) are nonnegative. The allocations (s, d, f, c, g)
for all stakeholders are nonnegative as well, and strictly positive for cleared stakeholders. This im-
plies that pii−αsi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ S∗, pij−αdj ≥ 0 for all j ∈ D∗, pil−αfl ≥ 0 for all l ∈ L∗, and pit−αct ≥ 0
for all t ∈ T ∗.
We can thus see that the price bounding properties emerge from both dual and Lagrangian dual
analysis, and have provided interpretations of price bounding properties as economic driving forces.
We summarize by noting that these driving forces capture information about spatial and product
value differentials and embed this information into the ISO clearing problem. Revenue adequacy also
implies price behavior within the coordinated market model relative to stakeholder bid costs (because
prices are bounded by bid costs). Specifically, revenue adequacy provides means of obtaining the
bounding properties inferred from the dual program.
We observe that the market clearing framework is consistent under negative bid prices. We are
interested in the specific behavior of a couple of such instances: negative consumer bids αdj < 0 and
negative supplier bids αsi < 0. By the price bounding properties in Theorem 4, such bids allow the
existence of corresponding prices pij < 0 and pii < 0. The physical interpretation of a consumer j
offering αdj < 0 is that it is requesting (rather than offering) payment to receive a product. Likewise,
a supplier i offering αsi < 0 offers payment to have a product removed. The ISO may thus collect
revenue from both consumers and suppliers under appropriate bid values. We define the sets S− :=
{i ∈ S|αsi < 0} and S+ := {i ∈ S|αsi ≥ 0} for suppliers and D− := {j ∈ D|αdj < 0} and D+ :=
{j ∈ D|αdj ≥ 0} for consumers. Under this notation, the ISO can collect revenue from stakeholders
i ∈ S− and j ∈ D+. Using this bounding information to inform revenue collection in markets we can
expand the definition of revenue adequacy.
Corollary. The ISO can collect revenue from stakeholders i ∈ S− and j ∈ D+ to achieve revenue adequacy.
Proof. Follows from the proof of Theorem 3 with suppliers and consumers grouped into the subsets
S+, S−, D+, and D−:∑
i∈S+
piisi +
∑
i∈S−
piisi +
∑
l∈L
pilfl +
∑
t∈T
pitct −
∑
j∈D+
pijdj −
∑
j∈D−
pijdj = 0
Another important (non-obvious) outcome of the clearing procedure is that it will not induce
inefficient transportation cycles (as long as the transport bid costs are non-negative).
Theorem 5. If the transportation provider bids satisfy αfl > 0 for all l ∈ L then no cleared allocation contains
a transportation cycle.
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Proof. Consider a transportation cycle consisting of c nodes in which a product p is moved is moved
from node to node in the cycle from n1 → n2 → ... → nc−1 → nc → n1. Theorem 4 requires that
pil ≥ αfl > 0 for the cleared transportation providers l ∈ L∗. Following from this requirement, we
have the pricing relationship around the cycle pinc,p > pinc−1,p > ... > pin2,p > pin1,p > pinc,p. The
pricing requirements upon the cycle represent a logical contradiction.
This property provides efficiency guarantees about the physical behavior of the allocations made
by the ISO. Coordinated markets capture complex interdependencies between stakeholders and hav-
ing this information available to the ISO avoids inefficient outcomes. In uncoordinated settings,
particularly where transactions are conducted between individual stakeholders, no such guarantees
of efficiency exist. The result makes market coordination especially attractive where transportation
costs represent a significant portion of total market value (e.g., waste collection).
3 Enforcing Stakeholder Participation in Markets
Coordinated markets are based on voluntary stakeholder participation driven by natural economic
incentives. The ISO bases its allocations on these incentives to deliver competitive results that gener-
ate maximum profit for stakeholders. It is important that the ISO does not assume the participation
of any stakeholder when creating its allocations. In other words, from a policy standpoint, the ISO
should be unable to force a stakeholder to participate in a market. From a modeling perspective,
this means stakeholder allocations cannot be forced to specific values; doing so would imply that the
ISO can compel stakeholder participation in the market. On the other hand, there are situations in
which there are no incentives for a market to exist (e.g., waste markets) and thus one must deter-
mine appropriate mechanisms to activate the market. Intuitively, this can be done by forcing par-
ticipation (e.g., force provision of waste management services). In this section we show that forcing
stakeholder participation destroys economic properties of a coordinated market. These results are
important because traditional SC formulations enforce provision of services (e.g., satisfy demands
or force supply). While intuitive from a primal perspective, such constructs can generate financially
inefficient outcomes that alter stakeholder incentive). We use these results to argue that promoting
participation in SCs should be attained by using economic incentives that preserve the properties of
the market. In the next section, we provide procedures to determine suitable incentives that promote
participation (that activate markets).
We define constraints of the type in (3.11), where si ∈ R+, dj ∈ R+, f l ∈ R+, and ct ∈ R+ represent
minimum enforced allocations assumed by the ISO. For each enforcing participation constraint, we
also define a dual variable λi ∈ R+, λj ∈ R+, λl ∈ R+, and λt ∈ R+.
si ≥ si, i ∈ S, (λi) (3.11a)
dj ≥ dj , j ∈ D, (λj) (3.11b)
fl ≥ f l, l ∈ L, (λl) (3.11c)
ct ≥ ct, t ∈ T , (λt) (3.11d)
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Including any of the constraints of the type in (3.11) in the clearing model will destroy some key
economic properties but will not affect others. We first examine the nature of these constraints and
their impacts on the clearing outcomes through the Lagrangian dual formulation, which will reveal
that the profit-seeking nature of the coordinated market is unaffected by the forced participation
constraints. Beginning from the Lagrangian function in (2.7) we introduce the forcing constraints in
(3.12).
L(s, d, f, c, g, pi) = −
∑
j∈D
φdj +
∑
i∈S
φsi +
∑
l∈L
φfl +
∑
t∈T
φct

+
∑
j∈D
(dj − dj)λj +
∑
i∈S
(si − si)λi +
∑
l∈L
(f
l
− fl)λl +
∑
t∈T
(ct − ct)λt
(3.12)
The terms associated with the forced participation constraints are such that either the constraint
is active and has zero slack (i.e., (si − si) = 0, for suppliers) or the constraint is inactive and the
associated dual (λi, for suppliers) is zero. In either case, the associated terms in (3.12) will evaluate
to zero, so the profit-seeking property is preserved.
To illustrate the economic properties of the market clearing problem with forced participation,
we once again turn to the dual formulation in (3.13). Here, the dual variables of forced participation
constraints appear in the both the objective function and the constraints.
min
pi,λ
∑
i∈S
siλi +
∑
j∈D
djλj +
∑
l∈L
f lλl +
∑
t∈T
ξtλt
−
∑
i∈S
siλi −
∑
j∈D
djλj −
∑
l∈L
f
l
λl −
∑
t∈T
ξ
t
λt
(3.13a)
pibaln(i),p(i) − λi + λi ≥ αsi , i ∈ S (3.13b)
pibaln(j),p(j) + λj − λj ≤ αdj , j ∈ D (3.13c)
pibaln(l),p(l) − pibaln′(l),p(l) − λl + λl ≥ αfl , (l) ∈ L (3.13d)∑
p∈Pgent
γt,ppi
bal
n(t),p(t) −
∑
p∈Pcont
γt,ppi
bal
n(t),p(t) − λt + λt ≥ αξt , t ∈ T (3.13e)
We use the price identities to rewrite the dual constraints (3.13b) to (3.13e) (in terms of stakeholder
prices (pii, pij , pil, pit)) and this results in (3.14). Importantly, in all of these constraints, we observe that
the signs corresponding to the dual variables (λi, λj , λl, λt) are such that each relaxes the bound
associated with the corresponding stakeholder bid (αsi , α
d
j , α
f
l , α
ξ
t ).
pii − λi + λi ≥ αsi , i ∈ S (3.14a)
pij + λj − λj ≤ αdj , j ∈ D (3.14b)
pil − λl + λl ≥ αfl , l ∈ L (3.14c)
pit − λt + λt ≥ αξt , t ∈ T (3.14d)
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Strong duality implies that when the forced participation constraints are active, the corresponding
duals (λi, λj , λl, λt) will be non-negative. Furthermore, let us assume that si > si so that λi = 0
and let the corresponding relationships apply such that λj , λl, and λt are also zero under active
forced participation (i.e., when the forcing constraints are active and the upper bounding constraints
are inactive). When the forced participation constraints are active, the duals (λi, λj , λl, λt) allow
stakeholder bid bounds to be violated according to (pii−αsi ) ≥ −λi, (αdj −pij) ≥ −λj , (pil−αfl ) ≥ −λl,
and (pit − αξt ) ≥ −λt, and from these results we observe the price bounding properties are lost.
Importantly, this violation destroys the guarantee of having non-negative profits for all stakeholders
(stakeholders can lose money in the market).
The previous results lead to interesting implications about ISO behavior under forced participa-
tion. The ISO does not need to recognize price bounds for such stakeholders; as such, it can raise or
lower prices in violation of their bids to ensure that markets clear (even if they are allocated negative
profits). The interpretation for a consumer compelled to purchase is that the ISO can raise the market
price above the consumer bid according to pij ≤ αdj + λj . The consumer is compelled to accept a
market price above its bid. Similarly, a supplier forced to participate in a market may be subject to
prices below its service bid according to pii ≥ αsi −λi. From an efficiency perspective, note that forcing
participation implicitly forces the ISO to use services or products that are inefficient (e.g., forces use
of a technology even if this is too costly).
We have observed that profit seeking is maintained in the market under forced participation, so
Theorem 1 applies to stakeholders unconstrained by minimum allocations. The profit maximizing
property does not apply to stakeholders compelled to participate. Due to the limited application of
profit seeking, Theorem 2 will not be satisfied either, as it is predicated on individual profit maxi-
mization. As such, the interpretation of the solution as a competitive equilibrium is lost under forced
participation.
Interestingly, revenue adequacy (Theorem 3) still holds under forced participation since it is pred-
icated on satisfaction of the market clearing constraints. To see this, consider an optimal set of alloca-
tions (s, s, d, d, f, f , c, c, g, g) for the market clearing problem subject to enforced allocations s, d, f , c, g.
The clearing constraints hold at optimality, implying:
sn,p + sn,p +
∑
l∈Linn
fl +
∑
l∈Linn
f
l
+
∑
t∈T genn,p
gt +
∑
t∈T genn,p
g
t
−dn,p − dn,p −
∑
l∈Loutn
fl −
∑
l∈Loutn
f
l
−
∑
t∈T conn,p
ct −
∑
t∈T conn,p
ct = 0,
Applying the market price identities, we express the dual multiplier pibaln,p in terms of prices pii, pij ,
pil, and pit, and also rewrite technology inputs and outputs in terms of reference products p¯(t). Let
us define notation for sets of forced allocations as Sˇ and unforced allocations as S˙ (using the same
marks for each stakeholder class). Now we write:∑
i∈S˙
piisi +
∑
i∈Sˇ
piisi +
∑
l∈L˙
pilfl +
∑
l∈Lˇ
pilf l +
∑
t∈T˙
pitct +
∑
t∈Tˇ
pitct −
∑
j∈D˙
pijdj −
∑
j∈Dˇ
pijdj = 0.
This relationship demonstrates that revenue adequacy holds in the presence of forced allocations. It
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follows that revenue collected from consumers is sufficient to make payments to stakeholders under
relaxed price bounding properties.
The results of Theorem 5 will be lost as well under forced participation. Specifically, forcing
participation allows for potential transport costs that are zero or negative and can create inefficient
routes (cycles). This result intuitively makes sense since forcing (say demand satisfaction) will force
transportation players to provide services (even if such services are inefficient). We can thus see that
forcing participation of even one player can propagate through the market to activate it but this can
create widespread inefficiencies.
4 Market-Activating Bids
Motivated by the loss of economic properties resulting from forced market participation, we are inter-
ested in activating a market through economic incentives. Specifically, such incentives are provided
by bidding costs. Our goal is to determine market-activating bid values, by which we mean the set
of bids from consumers and suppliers capable of clearing market transactions with zero profit (i.e.,
these are break-even bids). Such bids define threshold market clearing prices and market existence
criteria. Our interest in zero-profit markets is also driven by an inherent property of the market
clearing framework: the distribution of profits among cleared stakeholders is often degenerate (there
exist multiple ways to allocate the profit between stakeholders). A solution with zero profit avoids
the profit allocation problem, even if it does not define unique allocations.
Our results provide intuition for policy makers to strategically determine how to activate markets
by either entering the market as stakeholders or by providing incentives that shift stakeholder bids
(e.g., provide credits). For instance, in a nutrient-trading market, a government agency that repre-
sents a lake can offer to allow nutrient emissions but subject to a tax that covers remediation costs
associated with algal blooms. This program (if the emissions cost is sufficiently high) will create an
incentive for startup technologies that offer services to recover nutrients. These incentives provide an
economic setting where new technologies can be profitable because they offer a solution that is less
expensive than the alternative. In this case, the objective of imposing a cost on nutrient emissions
is to incentivize the businesses that produce the emissions to pay for nutrient recovery technologies.
The incentive structure activates the market for nutrient recovery. Market-activating bids provide
incentives that create a favorable setting to invest in new technologies. This is precisely how coordi-
nated electricity markets operate in the US; here, satisfaction of demands is enforced by defining a
bid known as the value-of-lost-load (VOLL). This bid cost captures the value of electricity to society
and is set to values that are as high as 1,000 USD per MWh (the average cost in the US is around 10
USD per MWh). Effectively, VOLL operates as a market-activating bid that promotes provision of
electricity. This is used, for instance, as a mechanism to enforce provision of electricity in remote ar-
eas. Effectively, market activating bids enforce participation but this is done via economic incentives
(not by enforcing constraints). This approach preserves the economic properties of the market.
We define a market-activating bid for a consumer j ∈ D+ as αdj and for a supplier i ∈ S− as
αsi . Under this conceptualization, the other stakeholder bids α
s
i , i ∈ S+, αdj , j ∈ D−, αfl , l ∈ L,
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and αct , t ∈ T are interpreted as constants used to determine αdj and αsi . The stakeholders (D+,S−)
represent revenue sources in a market and (S+,D−,L, T ) represent revenue sinks. Here, S = S−∪S+
and D = D− ∪ D+. The bids (αd, αs) define remuneration rates corresponding to the allocations
(s, d, f, c, g) resulting in clear transactions (S∗,D∗,L∗, T ∗) with profits φ = (φs, φd, φf , φc) = 0. We
first demonstrate that market-activating bids will result in zero profits through a revenue adequacy
argument. Subsequently, we demonstrate how market-activating bids can be calculated by exploiting
the topology of the supply chain graph in the form of what we call a stakeholder graph.
4.1 Revenue Adequacy Interpretation of Market-Activating Bids
We use the definition of revenue adequacy to demonstrate that market-activating bids provide zero
profit while remunerating stakeholders.
Theorem 6. The market-activating bids (αd, αs) with associated optimal allocations (d, s, f, c, g) for (S∗,D∗,L∗, T ∗)
provide the economic funds required to achieve revenue adequacy with zero profit.
Proof. By definition, the market-activating bids provide zero profit; consequently, we substitute the
bids (αd, αs) and (αs, αd, αf , αc) to obtain:
φdj (pij , α
d
j , dj) = (α
d
j − pij)dj = 0, j ∈ D+∗
φsi (pii, α
s
i , si) = (pii − αsi )si = 0, i ∈ S−∗
φsi (pii, α
s
i , si) = (pii − αsi )si = 0, i ∈ S+∗
φdj (pij , α
d
j , dj) = (α
d
j − pij)dj = 0, j ∈ D−∗
φfl (pil, α
f
l , fl) = (pil − αfl )fl = 0, l ∈ L∗
φct(pit, α
c
t , ct) = (pit − αct)ct = 0, t ∈ T ∗
Since the allocations (d, s, f, c, g) are nonzero in cleared transactions, the profit relationships imply
the market-activating pricing properties:
pij = α
d
j , j ∈ D+∗
pii = α
s
i , i ∈ S−∗
pii = α
s
i , i ∈ S+∗
pij = α
d
j , j ∈ D−∗
pil = α
f
l , l ∈ L∗
pit = α
c
t , t ∈ T ∗
We thus have that market prices for clear transactions are equal to the corresponding bids, including
the market-activating bids. Using the definition of revenue adequacy in Theorem 3 and substituting
the market-activating pricing results we obtain:∑
j∈D+
αdjdj −
∑
i∈S−
αsisi =
∑
i∈S+
αsi si −
∑
j∈D−
αdjdj +
∑
l∈L
αfl fl +
∑
t∈T
αctct
demonstrating that market-activating bids provide funds to ensure revenue adequacy with zero
stakeholder profit.
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The intuition behind this result is that stakeholders (S+,D−,L, T ) in a coordinated market re-
quire a given level of remuneration to participate, and this remuneration may be obtained from the
stakeholders (D+,S−) (these can be seen as players that drive the market). We now provide a proce-
dure to determine market-activating bids.
4.2 Computing Market-Activating Bids
Market-activating bid calculations are based on the topology of the SC graph. To properly define
these calculations, we turn to graph theoretical properties of SC networks. To facilitate our analysis,
we propose the concept of the stakeholder graph; this graph is a product-based representation of the
SC (typically analyzed using a node-based representation) that reveals how products connect stake-
holders. Specifically, the stakeholder graph captures how products and associated economic values
flow from suppliers to consumers through transformation and transportation steps. The stakeholder
graph will also reveal natural ordering and boundaries of the SC (defined by suppliers and con-
sumers) and its internal steps (transportation and transformation).
Definition 1. Stakeholder Graph. The stakeholder graph associated with a SC is denoted asG(V,E);
here, the stakeholders (suppliers, consumers, transportation providers, and technology providers)
are defined as nodes V = {S,D,L, T } and the arcs E connect the players as follows:
• A supplier i and consumer j are connected if p(i) = p(j) and n(i) = n(j).
• A supplier i and transport provider l are connected if p(i) = p(l) and ns(l) = n(i) (the case
nr(l) = n(i) does not make sense because a supplier cannot receive product).
• A consumer j and transport provider l are connected if p(j) = p(l) and nr(l) = n(j) (the case
ns(l) = n(j) does not make sense because a consumer cannot send product).
• A supplier i and technology provider t are connected if p(i) ∈ Pcont (the case p(i) ∈ Pgent does
not make sense because the supplier cannot receive product).
• A consumer i and technology provider t are connected if p(j) ∈ Pgent (the case p(j) ∈ Pcont does
not make sense because the consumer cannot send product).
• A transportation provider l and a technology provider t are connected if either: i) p(l) ∈ Pcont
and nr(l) = n(t) or ii) p(l) ∈ Pgent and ns(l) = n(t).
• Suppliers i and i′ cannot be connected (implies one receives product).
• Consumers j and j′ cannot be connected (implies one provides product).
• Transport providers l and l′ are connected if either: i) ns(l) = nr(l′) or ii) nr(l) = ns(l′).
• Technology providers t and t′ are connected if n(t) = n(t′) and either: i) there exists p ∈ Pgent
such that p ∈ Pcont′ or ii) there exists p ∈ Pcont such that p ∈ Pgent′ .
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Note that the above definitions imply that the boundary of the stakeholder graph B(G) ⊆ V
is such that i ∈ B(G) and j ∈ B(G) but l /∈ B(G) and t /∈ B(G) . In other words, suppliers and
consumers define the boundaries and technology and transport providers are internal nodes. The
stakeholder graph reveals important rules of the market architecture that are not immediately obvi-
ous from the traditional node-based representation. We now proceed to show that the abstraction
allows us to define market-activating bids by following paths that connect the boundaries of the
graph. The stakeholder graph can be seen as an alternative representation of the so-called p-graph
used in process engineering [13]. In the stakeholder graph, however, we do not define product nodes
(as products define stakeholder graph connectivity) and we capture transportation.
We illustrate the utility of the stakeholder graph representation of the SC in Figure 2. The product-
based representation (figure center) reveals a directed acyclic graph (DAG) structure of the SC which
is not obvious from the node-based representation (left). In addition, the product-based representa-
tion reveals how products flow between boundaries (from suppliers to consumers) through internal
steps (transportation and transformation). We emphasize this representation using a set of eleven
products in Figure 2 (right) demonstrating that products define the connectivity between stakehold-
ers. Paths through the stakeholder graph branch at some technologies (because they can produce
multiple products or there are multiple consumers of a product) or collapse branches (because they
consume multiple products or there are multiple suppliers of a product).
Figure 2: Node-based (left) and product-based (center, right) representation of a supply chain. The
product-based abstraction (stakeholder graph) elucidates paths in the SC that connect suppliers to
consumers via transport and transformation steps. The center figure illustrates connections between
stakeholders. The right figure emphasizes that products define connections in the stakeholder graph.
We proceed to calculate market-activating bids in terms of paths between nodes in the stake-
holder graph representation. A path is a series of distinct connected nodes in a graph. Each node in
the stakeholder graph has an associated stakeholder type (a supplier, a consumer, a transport, or a
technology). All stakeholder graph nodes retain the associated stakeholder bid (αsi , α
d
j , α
f
l , α
c
t) as an
attribute. Technology nodes in the stakeholder graph also retain the technology yield coefficients γt,p
as attributes. Arcs in this representation are unweighted, capturing only topological (connectivity)
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information. As a convenient shorthand, we will denote the set of arcs in a stakeholder graph {N ,P}
to condense the list of attributes. All flows in the stakeholder graph are directed from suppliers
towards technology providers or consumers. The graph may be partitioned into layers of suppli-
ers, technology providers, transportation providers, and consumers. That such a partitioning can
be achieved will allow us to express market-activating bids with respect to paths through the stake-
holder graph. The paths of interest connect a stakeholder u ∈ V (from whom the ISO will collect
revenue) to a stakeholder v ∈ V (to whom the revenue will be allocated). Stakeholders that activate
the market (by providing revenue) are defined as u ∈ {D+,S−}withD+ ⊆ D and S− ⊆ S. The stake-
holders reached by the activation (to whom revenue is allocated) are defined as v ∈ {D−,S+, T, L}.
For convenience, we define the set of market-activating stakeholders asA := {D+,S−} and the set of
reached stakeholders as R := {D−,S+, T, L}. We denote a path from a stakeholder u to v as W and
useW(u, v) to denote the set of all paths that connect u and v.
Central to our analysis is the observation that the stakeholder graph will tend to have a DAG
structure (it has no product cycles). The DAG structure will be key in analyzing how allocations and
economic value flow through the SC. We will seek to establish conditions under which the presence of
product cycles in a market clearing allocation implies that the allocation is infeasible (non-physical).
In doing so, we note that product cycles can only be induced internally in the network by connect-
ing technologies via cycles. Consequently, we will seek to follow a products along such technology
cycles.
Figure 3: Example supply chain structure with a technology cycle used in the proof of Theorem 7. The
cycle eventually converts a output product of a technology back into one of its input products. The
cycle may contain transportation cycles or other input and output products along the cycle (this does
not change the conclusions of the analysis). Product transport is indicated by a product label inside
a transport node (in gray) products exchanged directly between technology providers are indicated
by a product label adjacent to the arrow connecting them.
Theorem 7. The market clearing procedure can deliver non-physical allocations (infeasible to the market clear-
ing problem) in the presence of technology cycles.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. We establish an arbitrary technology cycle within an arbitrary
SC. Without loss of generality, assume the cycle connects to the SC through a technology t1 which
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has as its outputs at least two products, p0 and p1, and at least one input q. Define the technology
cycle consisting of C technologies such that t2 has as an input product p1 and produces product p2,
technology t3 consumes p2 and produces p3, and so on, with tC consuming pC−1 and producing
product q which can now be consumed by technology t1. Assume that the ISO delivers a physical
allocation in the SC containing such a cycle. Associated with each output from each technology
is a yield coefficient γt,p (we assume that input coefficients are all one without loss of generality)
and with these assumptions we construct the constraints for the technology cycle. We assume that
all technologies in the cycle are located at a single node n, and that node n′ is another SC node
comprising a source of q and a sink for p0.
We make no other assumptions about the nature of the SC, and observe that technology nodes
in the cycle may be located at different geographical nodes (i.e., a transportation provider may be
required within the cycle to move product between technologies) without changing the nature of our
results. Moreover, elements of the cycle may have inputs or outputs from elsewhere in the SC. We
depict the supply chain structure in Figure 3. Under this construct, we have the following balance
and conversion constraints for the cycle.
fn′,n,q + gtC ,q = ct1,q
gt1,p0 = fn,n′,p0
gt1,p1 = ct2,p1
gt2,p2 = ct3,p2
...
gtC−1,pC−1 = ctC ,pC−1
γt1,p0ct1,q = gt1,p0
γt1,p1ct1,q = gt1,p1
γt2,p2ct2,p1 = gt2,p2
γt3,p3ct3,p2 = gt3,p3
...
γtC ,qctC ,pC−1 = gtC ,q
We repeat substitution of these constraints to define gtC ,q in terms of product flows around the cycle.
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The procedure is illustrated as follows:
gtC ,q = γtC ,qctC ,pC−1
= γtC ,qgtC−1,pC−1
...
= γtC ,q...γtC ,p3ct3,p2
= γtC ,q...γt3,p3gt2,p2
= γtC ,q...γt3,p3γt2,p2ct2,p1
= γtC ,q...γt3,p3γt2,p2gt1,p1
= γtC ,q...γt3,p3γt2,p2γt1,p1ct1,q
= γtC ,q...γt3,p3γt2,p2γt1,p1(fn′,n,q + gtC ,q)
We denote the cumulative product yield γC := γtC ,q...γt3,p3γt2,p2γt1,p1 , resulting in:
gtC ,q
1− γC
γC
= fn′,n,q
We have the cycle production rate of product q (gtC ,q) in terms of the incoming rate of product q to
node n, fn′,n,q. The value of γC defines the relationship between the two, and results in one of three
possible outcomes:
• γC > 1: implies negative flow, thus the only feasible solution for the market clearing problem
is fn′,n,q = gtC ,q = 0,
• γC = 1: no feasible solution exists for market clearing for positive fn′,n,q; conversely, any posi-
tive gtC ,q with fn′,n,q = 0 is a feasible but non-physical solution,
• γC < 1: there is a feasible solution for market clearing satisfying the relationship with positive
gtC ,q and fn′,n,q.
The existence of possible non-physical solutions for γC ≥ 1 implies a contradiction.
The result indicates that existence of technology cycles in the market clearing allocations are de-
termined by the cumulative yield in a technology cycle. A cumulative cycle yields that have a value
larger than one leads to non-physical solutions, in particular, when cycle yield is equal to one, we
have demonstrated that the ISO can allocate an arbitrary positive amount to the cycle while simulta-
neously allocating zero to its input. This result is non-physical because flows in the market clearing
model must be traceable back to a supplier; other solutions imply a violation of the physical conti-
nuity of the model. Similarly, a cycle yield greater than one implies a negative flow, which is non-
physical, but since a negative allocation is infeasible, the only feasible allocation is zero. The only
way that the market clearing procedure delivers an allocation with cycles is if the cumulative yield is
strictly less than one, which would imply that there is loss of product along the cycle. This indicates
that the cycle provides an inefficient route. We highlight that the previous theorem does not prove
that this case cannot exist but it provides intuition as to why it might not occur. In practice, we have
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observed empirically that clearing allocations do not contain technology cycles. Formalizing this re-
sult is challenging due to interconnections of prices and physical allocations and will be left as a topic
of future work. In the discussion that follows we will assume that the SC has a DAG structure.
The stakeholder graph provides a node ordering which directs flows through paths of stakehold-
ers from suppliers to consumers. Where multiple suppliers or consumers are present in a single
stakeholder graph G, we are be able to partition G into subgraphs G′ ⊆ G. These subgraphs are
proper components obtained by partitioning of G along supplier and consumer vertices.
Definition 2. Stakeholder Graph Component: A stakeholder graph component is a subgraph G′ ⊆
G created by simultaneous partitioning along supplier and consumer vertices. The supply and de-
mand nodes are included in all subgraphs created this way.
Based on the definitions of the stakeholder graph and of the stakeholder graph component, we
can establish at least one such component always exists. Specifically, consider the topology of an
arbitrary graph G, either all supply and demand nodes in G have degree one (whereby G comprises
one component) or there is at least one supply or demand node in G with degree greater than one (in
which case G may comprise more than one component).
Figure 4: Example stakeholder graph with two components. Partitioning G along supplier node S2
yields subgraphs G1 and G2 that can be analyzed independently.
To illustrate the concept for the stakeholder graph component we introduce an example stake-
holder graph G in Figure 4 that contains two components (G1 and G2). The component subgraphs
are obtained by partitioning of G along the supplier node S2, which has a degree of two. The compo-
nents can be analyzed independently for purposes of determining bidding values.
The stakeholder graph provides a natural ordering of stakeholder nodes based on product prece-
dence. Flows are always directed from supply nodes to consumers nodes and pass through transport
and technology providers. The relative positions of stakeholders u ∈ A and v ∈ R along the graph
influence how remuneration is determined from u to v.
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The remuneration rate for the activator is obtained by transforming the bid associated with stake-
holder v (defined for a given product p(v)) into the product basis corresponding to u (given by p(u))
. Product transformations are associated with technology providers and are captured by the yield
coefficients γt,p. We change the product basis by capturing all transformations along the path con-
necting u and v (i.e., for stakeholders k ∈ W ). We denote the yield coefficients along the path W as
γgent(k),p(k) for p ∈ Pgent and γcont(k),p(k) for p ∈ Pcont . For the purpose of the basis change, we can view a
transport process as a technology with input and output yield coefficients of one (no transformation).
If u is upstream of v, then the correct product basis change is defined by the quotient of technology
yield coefficients as:
1
γconv
∏
k∈W
γgenk
γconk
, u ∈ A, v ∈ R, (4.15)
in which we note that having defined our stakeholder bids (in particular technology bids) relative to
inputs, we exclude the output yield coefficient associated with v. In the case that u is downstream of
v we have: ∏
k∈W
γconk
γgenk
, u ∈ A, v ∈ R. (4.16)
Without loss of generality, we will proceed by adopting the convention that u is downstream of v.
With these definitions and results, we are now in a position to construct the market-activating bid
computation procedure. A stakeholder v ∈ R in a market G has an associated bid denoted αv that
defines the remuneration rate required for v to participate in the market. The ISO can collect revenue
to remunerate v from stakeholders u ∈ A in the same graph component G′ ⊆ G. Let us define
βu,v ∈ [0, 1] as the fraction remuneration for stakeholder v provided by stakeholder u, subject to the
criterion that
∑
u∈A βu,v = 1, v ∈ R. Stakeholders u and v are connected by a path W ∈ W(u, v). The
product basis change along W ultimately defines the bid required from stakeholder u to remunerate
stakeholder v and is given by αu,v, which we denote the partial bid in (4.17).
αu,v = βu,v
∏
k∈W
γconk
γgenk
αv, u ∈ A, v ∈ R (4.17)
Combining all revenue commitments αu,v from a given stakeholder u ∈ A to stakeholders v ∈ R de-
termines the market-activating bid for stakeholder u: αu (4.18). We will refer to αu as the stakeholder
u market-activating bid and to αu,v as its partial market-activating bids.
αu =
∑
v∈G′
βu,v
∏
k∈W
γconk
γgenk
αv, u ∈ A. (4.18)
We illustrate the breakdown of a market-activating bid using the stakeholder graph component
G1 from Figure 4. In Figure 5, we assume that D1 ∈ D+ is the market-activating player (i.e., a
consumer with a positive is a source of market revenue) and S1, S2 ∈ S+ are the reached players
(i.e., suppliers with positive bids demand payment and are revenue sinks). In this setting, all the
market revenue is obtained from D1 and this has to be sufficient to activate all players along the
suuply chain. The market-activating bid for D1 is αD1 . The breakdown of this bid into its partial bids
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Figure 5: Breakdown of consumer D1 market-activating bid into partial bids corresponding to each
remunerated stakeholder.
corresponding to each remunerated stakeholder is indicated in Figure 5. Concretely, the partial bid
from D1 to T2 is represented as:
αD1,T2 =
γT2,B
γT2,E
αT2 ,
Similarly, the remuneration rate to L1 is determined as:
αD1,L1 =
γT2,B
γT2,E
γT1,A
γT1,B
αL1,
illustrating how the yield coefficients in technologies T1 and T2 influence the remuneration rate from
D1 to transport provider L1. The yield factors accumulate along the path W (D1, L1). The partial bid
αD1,S2 follows the path W (D1, S2), and is determined as
αD1,S2 =
γT2,D
γT2,E
γT3,C
γT3,D
αS2 ,
where the yield coefficient γT2,D corresponds to the input product on the correct path. By construc-
tion, one product is defined as the reference input for each technology, and has a yield coefficient of
one. Technologies with multiple input products will thus have one input with a coefficient of one
and others with coefficients γt,p ∈ R+.
4.3 Properties of Market-Activating Bids
4.3.1 Revenue Distribution
The value βu,v represents the fractional revenue provided by stakeholder u to v. We now establish
that this fractioning of revenue over stakeholders u provides the correct revenue to stakeholder v.
Theorem 8. Consider a stakeholder graph G with activators A and targets R. Each stakeholder v ∈ R
is part of one or more paths W connecting to stakeholders u ∈ A, and there exist βu,v ∈ [0, 1] satisfying∑
u∈A βu,v = 1 such that the bids αu,v achieve revenue adequacy for stakeholder v.
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Proof. The result follows from Theorem 6. The total revenue provided to the ISO by the market-
activating stakeholders u ∈ Amust be sufficient to remunerate all cleared stakeholders. Specifically,
all revenue allocated to stakeholders v ∈ R is collected from stakeholders u ∈ A. Let us select an
arbitrary stakeholder v ∈ A; we define partial bids αu,v and optimal allocations µu for stakeholders u
and a service bid αv and optimal allocation θv for stakeholder v. Revenue adequacy for v is defined:∑
u∈A
αu,vµu = αvθv.
Revenue adequacy for stakeholder v is linearly separable over the stakeholders u ∈ A and the divi-
sion of remuneration between the u is degenerate (multiple divisions exist). We pick βu,v ∈ [0, 1], u ∈
A satisfying∑u∈A βu,v = 1 allowing us to rewrite revenue adequacy as:
αu,vµu = βu,vαvθv, u ∈ A
Thus revenue adequacy is achieved and v participates in the market for some distribution of remu-
neration defined by βu,v.
We observe that the ratio of θv:µu is equal to the cumulative yield between stakeholders u and v.
Rearranging results in
αu,v = βu,v
θv
µu
αv, u ∈ A.
Substitution of the equivalent product of input and output yield ratios for θvµu =
∏
k∈W
γconk
γgenk
recov-
ers the calculation for the partial market-activating bid calculation αu,v in equation 4.17.
We illustrate the distribution of stakeholder remuneration by modifying our example from Fig-
ure 5. In Figure 6 we now assumeD1 ∈ D+ and S1, S2 ∈ S− where the consumerD1 and suppliers S1
and S2 are all sources of market revenue (market-activating players). Figure 6 depicts the distribu-
tion of remuneration between them for technology T2 and transport provider L1. Market-activating
remuneration to T2 is defined by:
αD1,T2 = βD1,T2
γT2,B
γT2,E
αT2
αS1,T2 = βS1,T2
γT1,B
γT1,A
1
γT2,B
αT2
αS2,T2 = βS2,T2
γT3,D
γT3,C
1
γT2,D
αT2
βD1,T2 + βS1,T2 + βS2,T2 = 1,
The remuneration distribution for stakeholder L1 is more complex and involves computing a remu-
neration rate based on a path that travels both up and downstream in the stakeholder graph. The bid
distribution for L1 is defined by the set of equations
αD1,T2 = βD1,L1
γT2,B
γT2,E
γT1,A
γT1,B
αL1
αS1,T2 = βS1,L1αL1
αS2,T2 = βS2,L1
γT3,D
γT3,C
γT2,B
γT2,D
γT1,A
γT1,B
αL1
βD1,L1 + βS1,L1 + βS2,L1 = 1.
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Figure 6: Breakdown of consumer D1 market-activating bid into partial bids corresponding to each
remunerated stakeholder.
In each case, the β coefficients (each in the range [0, 1]) have a combined total of 1, ensuring that the
total revenue received
4.3.2 Remuneration Properties over Multiple Pathways
Equation (4.18) implicitly assumes that the stakeholder graph features a single pathW between stake-
holders u and v. Multiproduct supply chains need not conform to this topology. Specifically, multi-
input multi-output technologies can give rise to supply chains in which there are multiple paths
between the stakeholders in the boundary. Consider the example in Figure 7 in which two paths,
WB(D1, S1) and WD(D1, S1) (indexed by the products produced by technology T1 for convenience)
are available between stakeholders D1 and S1. How the remuneration rate from D1 to S1 is deter-
mined is unclear from the analysis so far.
Figure 7: Illustrative example for multiproduct SC with multiple paths between stakeholders. Two
paths between stakeholders S1 and D1 exist, and are highlighted to illustrate the stakeholders in-
cluded in each.
To deal with this more complex setting, we define the set of paths between one stakeholder u and
a second v asW(u, v); a subset of all paths. Define the cumulative yield:
γˆW :=
∏
k∈W
γgenk
γconk
,
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for all paths W ∈ W(u, v). The path W which determines the remuneration rate from u to v is the
one having the minimum cumulative yield γˆW . This result follows from the physical requirements
of multi-input multi-output technologies: the minimum γˆW corresponds to the limiting product p ∈
Pcont among the inputs to a technology t along the path W (we define this product as pˆ). The supply
chain needs to provide enough of this product to satisfy the input requirement at t, and other inputs
will be provided in excess as a result.
Theorem 9. Assume thatW(u, v) is not a singleton (there exist multiple remuneration paths from stakeholder
u to stakeholder v). A revenue adequate remuneration rate for v is determined according to the minimum path
yield γˆW .
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Assume that we have stakeholders u and v connected by a set
of paths W(u, v), and that the path yields γˆW are known for each path W . Also assume that there
is a unique minimum path yield γˆ∗W with corresponding path W
∗. Now, let us select some other
path W with yield γˆW , and calculate remuneration rates for stakeholder v according to this path.
Now claim that this remuneration rate is sufficient to incentivize v to participate in the market (i.e.,
leads to adequate remuneration). We proceed to show that this will result in a contradiction. Further,
assume that u is the sole source of revenue in the market and βu,v = 1 as a simplification. From the
definition of path yields, we express the remuneration rate from u to v as:
αu,v =
1
γˆW
αv,
Define the optimal allocations µu and θv, for the stakeholders u and v and observe that revenue
adequacy for stakeholder v is:
αu,vµu = αvθv,
which we can express as
αu,v =
θv
µu
αv =
1
γˆ∗W
αv,
since this physical relationship is known. We have stated that γˆ∗W < γˆW by assumption, and thus
1
γˆ∗W
αv >
1
γˆW
αv
implying
αu,v > αu,v,
which is a contradiction (the only remuneration rate that does not arise in a contradiction is that
determined by γˆ∗W ).
The definition of path yield allows us to express market-activating bid calculations in the presence
of multiple paths W ∈ W(u, v) as:
αu,v = βu,v max
W∈W(u,v)
∏
k∈W
γconk
γgenk
αv, u ∈ A, v ∈ R. (4.19)
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We observe that this generalizes the expression in (4.17) to multiple paths. For example, consider
the SC in Figure 7. Assume γˆB = 1, and γˆD = 0.5, again using products to distinguish between the
two paths. Regardless of the individual technology yield coefficients, γˆD tells us that we will require
twice the supply of product A from supplier S1 on the path WD(D1, S1) than is required along the
pathWB(D1, S1), and that S1 must be remunerated accordingly. This result also tells us that there will
be an excess of product B. Since product A is the precursor to both products B and D, the supplier
S1, transport provider L1, and technology T1 must all be remunerated according to the amount of
product A required on the path WD(D1, S1) determined by the path yield γˆD.
5 Case Study
5.1 Problem Setting
We illustrate the concepts discussed using a municipal solid waste (MSW) case study for a small-
sized city of 100,000 citizens. These citizens are suppliers that pay for a waste collection service that
transports their waste to a local landfill. Several recycling (processing) services exist within the city
that convert specific waste products into value-added products. There is a sorting process available
to separate waste streams and recycling services may purchase sorted waste as a feedstock from this
service. The landfill charges a tipping fee to dispose of sorted or unsorted waste. Also included
in the system is an electrical power producer that supplies electricity to city residents and to the
recycling service providers. This setting defines a waste management economy in which recycling
technologies provide a route to divert waste from landfills. We model this system as a multiproduct
supply chain and use our coordinated market interpretation to investigate incentives that can activate
recycling services and that foster landfill diversion. These results may be of interest to policymakers
in similarly sized cities (e.g., the City of Madison, Wisconsin has a reported population on the order
of 260,000 people). We provide a perspective on how to apply our insights to such settings.
The US EPA estimates that the average citizen is responsible for the generation of 4.4 lbs of MSW
per day [3]. Globally, it is estimated that 1.5 billion tonnes of MSW are landfilled annually, producing
widespread impacts (e.g., greenhouse gas emissions, leaching, land use). Encouraging MSW recy-
cling can stimulate local economies and prevent environmental impacts associated with landfills[30].
Unfortunately, establishing waste markets that are financially sustainable is nontrivial due to conflict-
ing interests of the stakeholders involved and due to the inherently low value of waste streams and
recycled products. For instance, Vossberg and co-workers demonstrate that the market for recycled
glass can be difficult to maintain because the recycling process (involving transportation and pro-
cessing) is more expensive than the production of virgin glass [32]. Similar obstacles are encountered
for other waste streams (e.g., food waste and plastic).
The EPA provides estimates for the composition of MSW consisting of nine categories by weight
percent [3]. For the purposes of this study the EPA’s ”food” and ”lawn” categories are combined
into ”organic waste,” and the categories ”rubber, leather, and textiles,” ”wood,” and ”other” are
grouped as ”non-recyclable.” The remaining categories are paper, glass, metals, and plastics, which
are preserved. The resulting solid waste composition is presented in Table 1 and this includes the
30
http://zavalab.engr.wisc.edu
.
Table 1: Breakout of municipal waste composition for MSW case study.
Waste category Waste Label Mass Fraction (%) Annual Production (tonne/yr) Derived Products Product Label
Paper P01 27.0 19669 Recycled Paper P1
Glass P02 4.5 3278 Recycled Glass P2
Metals P03 9.1 6629 Recycled Metals P3
Plastics P04 12.8 9324 Recycled Plastics P4
Organic P05 28.1 20470 Compost P5
Non-recyclable P06 18.5 13477 - -
Total P0 100 72847 - -
.
Table 2: Recycling process data for MSW case study. Yield values are in tonnes (except for electricity
which is indicated in kWh).
Process Label Inputs Outputs Input Yield Output Yield Operating Cost (USD) Capacity (tonne)
Separation [3] T0 P0 P01, P02, P03, P04, P05, P06 1.00 0.270, 0.045, 0.091, 0.128, 0.281, 0.185 235.00 [27] 72847
Paper recycling T1 P01, PE P1, P06 1.00, 300 [19] 0.84,0.16 210.90 19669
Glass recycling T2 P02, PE P2 1.00, 175.50 [32] 1.00 39.06 3278
Metal recycling T3 P03, PE P3 1.00, 2960 [10] 1.00 1300.00 6629
Plastic recycling T4 P04, PE P4, P06 1.00, 438 [15] 0.672, 0.328 364.50 9324
Composting [31] T5 P05, PE P5 1.00, 8.41 0.80 21.00 20470
mass production rates corresponding to the selected population. Here we also include the possible
recycled products that can be produced from each waste product and the index assigned to each
product for the purposes of modeling notation.
All process technology data are presented in Table 2. Recycling technologies for paper, glass,
metal, and plastic wastes with associated yields and operating costs are obtained from Mohammadi
et al. [20] and Santibanez et al. [27]. Process details for organic waste composting are obtained from
van Haaren et al. [31]. Yield factors for process electricity requirements are obtained from literature
sources. Input and output process yields are combined into a conversion equation relating all inputs
and outputs to a reference input such that the reference input has a yield coefficient of one.
The drivers of the coordinated market model are the supply of waste streams and consumer
demand for recycled products. For the purposes of this case study, our interest lies in municipal-
scale transactions; a single supplier and consumer are modeled for each product, and the clearing of
that transaction is synonymous with the clearing of the entire market for that product. A simple SC
is defined consisting of a single node representing the city location (N1), a node for the separation
center (N2), a node for the landfill (N3), a node for the recycling service providers (N4), and a node
for the electrical power provider (N5). The waste separation center splits MSW into its component
streams which can be purchased by recycling service providers as process inputs. The landfill acts
as a consumer that places a negative bid cost for municipal waste, indicating that it will take the city
waste at a cost (tipping fee). Finally, recovered products from wast can be sold back to the city, which
acts as a consumer. Note that the city acts as a supplier that offers MSW and as a consumer that
requests electricity and recycled products (the city acts as two separate stakeholders). This notion
is important, because a circular economy that fosters product recycling does not imply that there
is a product cycle in the SC graph. The node-based and product-based representation of the MSW
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SC are presented in Figure 8. One of the advantages of the product-based representation is that we
are able to clearly represent material flows independently of the geographical arrangement of the
stakeholders. Moreover, it is also clear that the SC does not contain technology cycles. The product-
based representation provides a structure to manage SC complexity.
Figure 8: Node-based SC (left) and product-based stakeholder graph (right) for illustration problem;
stakeholders are abstracted into a DAG and are organized such that all transport flows are directed
left-to-right following proper paths. This behavior is not clear in the SC map. Products carried by
transporters are indicated on transportation nodes.
Stakeholder bid costs should provide incentives for the market to exist (for transactions to occur).
Here, we assume that city residents offer a bid of -321 USD per tonne of MSW taken away (the
negative value implying that they pay for this service) [16]. Transportation costs for waste products,
recycled products, and for compost are based on those in Garibay-Rodriguez et al. and are applied
on a per-tonne basis and according to product type [12]. The separation service bid cost is 235 USD
per tonne [27]. The landfill service bid (tipping fee) is -57.12 USD per tonne [28] based on average US
landfill fees (the negative bid value indicating the consumer requests payment to consume waste).
The bids for all recycling service providers are taken to be their operating cost values listed in Table
2. Supply-side bids have been obtained or estimated using literature data; the problem remains to
determine a set of demand bids which activate the MSW market and successfully divert waste from
the landfill. The market-activating bids represent the lowest cost that the city residents need to pay
for a given recycled product (recycled paper, glass, metal, plastic, compost, and electricity) to activate
a market. This analysis seeks to reveal key recyclable products that drive the market.
The capacities associated with product supply and demand bids are presented in Table 3; these
values represent the maximum amount of a product that a consumer is willing to buy and a supplier
is willing to provide. They are interpreted as upper limits on transaction volumes rather than pro-
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Table 3: Demand and supply capacity data; capacity values are in tonne per year except for electricity
(see S2 and DE) which are indicated in GWh per year
Stakeholder Node Product
Supply
Capacity
Demand
Capacity
Process
Capacity
City (S1) N1 P0 72,847 - -
Electrical grid (S2) N5 PE 1,070 - -
City (D1) N1 P1 - 16,522 -
City (D2) N1 P2 - 3,279 -
City (D3) N1 P3 - 6,630 -
City (D4) N1 P4 - 6,267 -
City (D5) N1 P5 - 16,376 -
City (DE) N1 PE - 1,040 -
Landfill (D0) N3 P0 - 72,847 -
Landfill (D01) N3 P01 - 19,669 -
Landfill (D02) N3 P02 - 3,278 -
Landfill (D03) N3 P03 - 6,629 -
Landfill (D04) N3 P04 - 9,324 -
Landfill (D05) N3 P05 - 20,470 -
Landfill (D06) N3 P06 - 20,630 -
Separator (T0) N2 P0 - - 72,847
Paper recycling (T1) N4 P01 - - 19,700
Glass recycling (T2) N4 P02 - - 3,278
Metal recycling (T3) N4 P03 - - 6,629
Plastic recycling (T4) N4 P04 - - 9,324
Composting (T5) N4 P05 - - 2,0470
visions to be satisfied. The table is divided into demand, supply, and process capacity columns to
indicate the products that are desired in the market and those that are available, as well as the trans-
formation capacities. Landfill demand capacities are assumed to be sufficient to absorb all waste
produced by the city. Additionally, the electrical grid is assumed to be able to provide sufficient
power to satisfy both the city and recycling service provider requirements. Electricity consumption
rates are estimated using EIA data [2] and supplier bid levels [1].
5.2 Market Activating Bids
Our results consist of nine case studies in which we vary the city demand bids for the five recy-
cled products (paper, glass, metal, plastic, and compost, corresponding to the demands D1 to D5
in Table 3). The demand bid for electricity is generally maintained at the Energy Information Ad-
ministration (EIA) value including transmission costs. The responses of interest in these cases are
stakeholder profits (presented in aggregate for transport services) product volumes exchanged, and
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product clearing prices. This information is collected in Table 4. Each column in the table corresponds
to one scenario and includes the objective function value (representing the scenario social welfare) the
bid values corresponding to the recycled product demands D1 to D5 and the city electricity demand
DE . We report the profits associated with demand, supply, transport, and technology stakeholders,
demand allocations, and the clearing prices at the city node N1. We also calculate the percentage
of waste recycled in each scenario, which is interpreted as the annual waste diversion from landfill
disposal. The nine presented cases are selected to demonstrate properties of the coordinated market
framework, or to provide contrast with scenarios in which stakeholders are forced to participate in
a market. The cases are numbered for reference. We discuss the motivation for and observations
resulting from each case in turn.
Case 1 demonstrates the use of the market clearing framework using a selection of bids suffi-
ciently high to activate all the recycling pathways. The bid values are set sufficiently high (either
1,500 USD per tonne, or 2,000 USD per tonne) that each recycling pathway is activated, but because
we do not apply a systematic approach to bid selection in this case, market profits (and social wel-
fare) are large. In this case, the electricity supplier, separation technology, and compost consumer
all have large associated profit values. Note that in the case of the consumer, its profit is counted as
money it did not need to spend (meaning that the market price for P5 (compost) is lower than the D5
bid. Checking the table confirms this observation; the bid for compost is 1,500 USD per tonne, while
the market price for compost is only 43.70 USD per tonne. Clearly, the bid of 1,500 USD per tonne is
inefficient in the face of this market price. This case illustrates an important property of the market
clearing framework: profit allocation is degenerate (has multiple solutions), and the ISO does not
always produce a “fair” allocation of profits to stakeholders [26]. In this case, profits are allocated to
four stakeholders, and all the others get nothing. Issues associated with fairness will be explored in
future work.
Moving on to case 2, we decide to lower stakeholder bids in an attempt to obtain a more efficient
set of market prices. Here, we set (again, with no real methodology to our choice) recycled product
bids to 500 USD per tonne, and we also decrease the city’s bid for electrical power to 0.10 USD per
kWh. The outcome of this bidding setting is that the recycling market is completely dry; all waste is
shipped to the landfill, and moreover, city residents are without power as well. The clearing prices
for recycled products satisfy the bounds (the bids) we set, but these bids are too low to activate the
markets.
In case 3, we will attempt to activate markets using a constraint that forces all the recycling technolo-
gies to be active. To be specific, we constrain the demands D1 to D5 and DE to be fulfilled to their
capacity values. In more realistic terms, the city municipal officials might mandate that waste is to
be recycled (to achieve landfill diversion). Further, since policy has been used to obtain the solution
we wanted, we will not increase our bids from the 500 USD per tonne level, nor from the 0.10 USD
per kWh level for power. From the allocation data in the table, we see that this approach achieves the
same results as case 1. Specifically, we have achieved 71% annual landfill diversion (a fair degree of
circularity, based on diversion alone) and at a lower bid cost, too. However, examination of stake-
holder profits reveals that three of the recycling technologies, as well as the city power supplier, are
operating at a loss (with large negative profits). By constraining the market model to force the partic-
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ipation of certain stakeholders, we allow the ISO to allocate negative profits, and lose a useful model
property, as we determined will occur in Section 3. In other words, our policy solution has resulted in
stakeholders operating at net annual loss. This is not a financially sustainable strategy for long-term
waste management; presumably the recycling services will soon go out of business because they are
not profitable (or would need to be subsidized externally). This result confirms our observations
that forcing market participation through constraints destroys the economic properties of the market
clearing model.
Cases 1 to 3 motivate the need for an approach to determine an economically sound mechanism
to activate markets. We thus apply our market-activating bid approach to generate further results.
In case 4, we use our approach to determine the market activating bids αdp according to the proce-
dure outlined in section 4 for consumers D1 to D5 such that each consumer bids enough to cover
the processing and transportation costs associated with the product; e.g., the market activating bid
associated with D1 is calculated based on technology T1, the disposal cost for non-recyclable waste
resulting from T1, and the transportation costs for product P1. We repeat this calculation for each of
D1 to D5, and present the results in column 4 as partial market activating bids. Solving the clearing
model, we observe that these bids result in a dry market once again, because in calculating them we
did not account for the cost of separation, and the city waste disposal bid is not sufficient to com-
pletely cover the separation cost, either. Since there is not sufficient revenue available to the ISO to
activate the market, the outcome is dry. Nevertheless, this result provides an opportunity: we use
Theorem 8 to distribute the cost of waste separation between the portion covered by the city’s waste
disposal bid and any of the recycled product consumers that we choose. To illustrate how this selec-
tion will influence the market we choose to calculate the additional bidding value required from each
stakeholderD1 toD5 in turn, and we present these as cases 5 to 9 in whichD1 toD5 cover the remain-
ing cost of separation. These columns are labeled as ”covering cases” in the table for shorthand. We
elect to put the burden of the separation cost on the recycled products rather than increasing the city
bid for waste disposal because it allows us to demonstrate distribution of remuneration to multiple
stakeholders. To illustrate the market activating bids, we demonstrate the calculations required to
determine the bid for the demand D1 in case 5 in Figure 9. This figure illustrates the calculations
leading to values of 66.30 USD per tonne MSW for city, and for the bid of 1165.62 USD per tonne
paper in case 5.
We present the bidding and solution data in cases 5 to 9 in table 4. We emphasize the covering
stakeholder bid in bold, while the other bids remain the same. We note that all five of these cases
result in cleared markets, and in each case all recycling markets are active, so the annual diversion
rate is 71% across the board. Importantly, any profits generated in these cases are small. Consider,
for example, the profit of 69.87 USD allocated to the separation service in case 5; this value is small
relative to the 78,247 tonnes of waste separated. Recalling our definition of profit from (2.3), the price
bounding properties in Section 2.2, and the revenue adequacy interpretation of market-activating
bids in Theorem 6, we conclude that achieving small profits is synonymous with bounding market
prices near stakeholder bids. Examination of the market prices in the results demonstrates that we
have achieved our goal; our market-activating bid methodology results in bids that bound market
prices closely; in our results the bid values we present are equal to the prices observed at least to the
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Figure 9: Calculation procedure for the D1 market-activating bid. The relevant SC substructure from
Figure 8 is included for illustration with arrows indicating the relevant remuneration from the sup-
plier S1 and the consumer D1. Note that both stakeholders share remuneration of technology T0
second decimal place (we need to allow a small profit to exist to break social welfare degeneracy with
the dry case). An important interpretation of these results is that when we say that profits are small,
we mean profits over and above the remuneration rate defined by stakeholder bids. Cases 5 to 9 are
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characterized by small profits. This does not mean that stakeholders are not making money. This
means that stakeholders are paying (or being paid) the amount they bid. These results demonstrate
the revenue adequacy property. Our methodology results in an efficient outcome for all stakeholders
(none are paying more than is required to keep the market active, nor receiving less than they need
to participate in the market) and our methodology mitigates pricing uncertainty for stakeholders.
Contrasting cases 2 and 5 elucidates useful properties of the market-activating bid approach. In
case 2 we set bids of 500.00 USD per tonne for each recycled product, and the resulting market was
dry. In case 5, two of the bids we calculated are lower than the 500.00 USD per tonne equivalent
in case 2. This result illustrates the SC dependence of the calculations. The market-activating bids
required from each stakeholder are a function of the network structure of the supply chain. This
also means that the total combined bid cost required to activate markets is not a single value but is
also dependent on SC structure. For instance, in case 5 the bid αdP1 is increased from 327.24 USD
per tonne up to 1,165.62 USD per tonne, a difference of 838.38 USD per tonne. In contrast, in case 7
the bid αdP3 increases from 1,702.59 USD per tonne to 3,792.10 USD per tonne, an increase of 2,089.51
USD per tonne. How we choose to activate markets (i.e., which stakeholder we assign the burden
of the separation cost in our example) results in a different bid cost. These differences are a function
of SC structure and technology yields. Moreover, these results demonstrate that upstream processes
have a different value to different stakeholders, which we are able to capture through market prices
and the bidding procedure. Consequently, we observe that we can activate markets using any of
the available products, but market prices reflect that it is more expensive to activate the market with
certain products.
The reader may observe a consistent trend in the results: the city, as a waste supplier, always
has a profit of at least 1.86×107 USD. The reader might also observe that the social welfare value
is also 1.86×107 USD. Indeed, under the interpretation of the market clearing objective function as
the total of stakeholder profits, we arrive at an interesting result. Case 2, the scenario in which
recycling markets are dry, has all waste sent to the landfill. Under the selected waste supplier bid of
-321 USD per tonne, and the landfill tipping fee of -57.12 USD per tonne, and waste transportation
cost of 9.18 USD per tonne, the resulting profit available is (321.00 - 57.12 - 9.18) = 254.70 USD per
tonne waste. Multiplying this value by 72,847 tonnes we obtain 1.86×107 USD, as observed as the
social welfare value. This result is interesting because it sets a baseline that the recycling market
must be able to exceed. If the social welfare value of the market with active recycling is less than
that where all waste is landfilled, then the landfill solution will be preferred according to the social
welfare metric. Moreover, our market activating bid methodology allows us to determine bid levels
that result in zero profit to stakeholders. This is a problem, since the social welfare of the recycling
market must be greater than the social welfare of landfilling if we want to incentivize recycling. To
ensure that the recycling market provides at least as much social welfare as the landfill solution, when
calculating market-activating bids we assume that the waste supplier S1 will not need to pay more
than it would in the landfill solution; i.e., the city’s contribution to paying for waste transport and
separation will not exceed 57.12 + 9.18 = 66.30 USD per tonne. This requirement is reflected in the
calculation illustrated in Figure 9. The profits made available this way are required in order to ensure
that the market attains the necessary social welfare value. If we did not make the profit available
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to be allocated to the supplier (or another stakeholder) we would instead need to calculate market
activating bids with an extra incentive value that makes the necessary profits available to be allocated
by the ISO. Thus in every case the social welfare is at least 1.86×107 USD; because this value is always
available from the landfill solution, the recycling market must be able to exceed it.
5.3 Drawing Comparisons
As a final evaluation of our results, we examine the City of Madison, which has similar-sized popula-
tion to our example problem, and two active landfills [9]. The city operating budget for 2018 reports
about 9.2 million USD in expected solid waste management expenses. We note that our 1,000,000
person model predicts a landfill revenue stream of 4.83 million. Accounting for the population dif-
ference suggests a landfill cost of about 12.6 million USD. Our predictions for landfill cost are on a
similar order of magnitude.
Comparison brings to mind an important difference between the city’s budget and our results:
our numbers represent cases in which either all waste is disposed of via landfilling, or where we
incentivize the maximum use of recycling to offset landfill use. In our case studies, 71% annual
landfill diversion is achievable (indicating that a large fraction of MSW can be circularized) and the
remaining fraction of waste is reckoned to consist of either non-recyclable materials or materials for
which a recycling program is not available. Importantly, this means our (scale adjusted) estimate of
landfill use cost represents an overestimate of the City of Madison cost. Scaling by the population,
our model suggests a cost 12.6 million USD cost for landfill use. Our overestimate may reflect the
fact that the City of Madison maintains an active recycling program of its own and is not using the
landfill to dispose of the entirety of the waste produced in the city.
Our case studies suggest that the total value of recycling (as measured in consumer revenue
streams) is about 36 million USD over all five recycling services. Adjusting for population, this would
suggest the social value of recycling all possible waste produced by a city the size of Madison, WI
would be something on the order of 93 million USD. This estimate provides an indicator of the value
of the materials that can be recovered from waste, but also suggest the value that these products must
have in order to incentivize and maintain the activity of recycling services.
Commodity prices provide a means of evaluating the market-activating bids we determined. The
June 1, 2020 spot price for aluminum is 1537.00 USD per tonne [6]; this price is slightly higher than the
consumer bid required in our case studies, but it is not sufficiently high if metals are to be penalized
to cover SC MSW separation costs. An estimate of the current HDPE price (as a comparator for
plastic) is obtained at 1141 USD per tonne [24]. This estimate is well in excess of the 679.62 USD per
tonne market price that we determine, but once again, falls short of the 2,890.20 USD per tonne that
we determine with the separation cost burden. These examples suggest that our methodology and
100,000 person case study produced reasonable values. The market data suggest that SC costs (like
upstream separation) may need to be distributed over multiple products in order to keep individual
product prices near the prices of similar commodities.
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Table 4: Results for coordinated market case studies.
1. Clear
Coordinated
2. Dry
Coordinated
3. Forced
4. Partial Bids
(Dry)
5. P1 Covering 6. P2 Covering 7. P3 Covering 8. P4 Covering 9. P5 Covering
Objective (USD)
7.95×107 1.86E+07 -2.48×107 1.86×107 1.86×107 1.86×107 1.86×107 1.86×107 1.86×107
Bids (USD/tonne)
αdD1 1,500.00 500.00 500.00 327.24 1165.62 327.24 327.24 327.24 327.24
αdD2 1,500.00 500.00 500.00 77.06 77.06 4302.52 77.06 77.06 77.06
αdD3 2,000.00 500.00 500.00 1,702.59 1,702.59 1,702.59 3,792.10 1,702.59 1,702.59
αdD4 1,500.00 500.00 500.00 679.62 679.62 679.62 679.62 2,890.20 679.62
αdD5 1,500.00 500.00 500.00 43.51 43.51 43.51 43.51 43.51 889.35
αdDE 0.15 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
Profits (USD)
City (P0 supply) 1.86×107 1.86×107 2.34×107 1.86×107 1.86×107 1.86×107 1.86×107 1.86×107 1.86×107
Grid (PE supply) 2.04×107 0.25 0.25
Landfill (P0 demand)
Transport
Separation (T0) 1.67×107 69.87 55.34 39.44 15.91
Paper recycling (T1)
Glass recycling (T2)
Metal recycling (T3)
Plastic recycling (T4)
Composting (T5)
City (P1 demand) 2.85×106
City (P2 demand) -1.73×107
City (P3 demand) -7.97×106
City (P4 demand) -1.13×106
City (P5 demand) 2.38×107 7.48×106 5.47×10−5 5.47×10−5 15.91
City (PE demand) -3.22×107 1,039.90 1,039.65 1,039.65 1,039.98 1,039.98 1,039.98
Demand Allocations
Landfill, P0 (tonne) 72,847 72,847
Landfill, P06 (tonne) 19,682 19,682 19,682 19,682 19,682 19,682 19,682
City, P1 (tonne) 16,521 16,521 16,521 16,521 16,521 16,521 16,521
City, P2 (tonne) 3,278 3,278 3,278 3,278 3,278 3,278 3,278
City, P3 (tonne) 6,629 6,629 6,629 6,629 6,629 6,629 6,629
City, P4 (tonne) 6,266 6,266 6,266 6,266 6,266 6,266 6,266
City, P5 (tonne) 16,376 16,376 16,376 16,376 16,376 16,376 16,376
City, PE (GWh) 1,040 1,040 1,040 1,040 1,040 1,040 1,040 1,040
Recycled waste (%)
71 71 71 71 71 71 71
City (N1) clearing prices
P0 (USD/tonne) -66.30 -66.30 -66.30 -66.30 -66.30 -66.30 -66.30 -66.30
P1 (USD/tonne) 1,500.00 500.00 330.47 327.24 1165.62 327.24 327.24 327.24 327.24
P2 (USD/tonne) 1,500.00 500.00 5,777.44 77.06 77.06 4,302.52 77.06 77.06 77.06
P3 (USD/tonne) 2,000.00 500.00 1,729.42 1,702.59 1,702.59 1,702.59 3,792.10 1,702.59 1,702.59
P4 (USD/tonne) 1,500.00 500.00 685.52 679.62 679.62 679.62 679.62 2,890.20 679.62
P5 (USD/tonne) 43.70 500.00 43.60 43.51 43.51 43.51 43.51 43.51 889.34
PE (USD/kWh) 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13
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6 Conclusions
We have derived economic properties for multi-product supply chains by using a coordinated market
interpretation. The Lagrangian and dual representations of the market clearing problem unravel fun-
damental economic properties (competitiveness and revenue adequacy) and reveal proper remuner-
ation mechanisms for stakeholders and pricing behavior. This analysis shows that in a coordinated
market, no stakeholder can incur a financial loss. The dual representation also reveals that activat-
ing markets by forcing stakeholder participation destroys such a guarantee and introduces arbitrary
price behavior. We presented a new product-based representation of a supply chain (we call this a
stakeholder graph) that captures interconnectivity of stakeholders via products. This representation
reveals market topology information that is not obvious from the traditional node-based (geograph-
ical) representation. The stakeholder graph reveals that it is unlikely for technology cycles to occur
and thus its topology is expected to have a directed acyclic graph structure. This structure allows us
to derive a computational procedure to calculate minimum bid costs that activate the market prior
to solving the market clearing problem. This market-activating analysis can be used to determine
market existence criteria (in the form of lower bounds on prices and bids) and can be used to guide
policy that seeks to incentivize markets. Notably, this analysis only relies on topological information
of the supply chain. We demonstrate the derived concepts using a case study for municipal waste
management. Here, we use our results to determine consumer bids that will activate recycling and
that will divert waste from the landfill. As part of future work, we would like to perform deeper
analysis on existence of technology cycles in stakeholder graphs. We are also interested in extending
out framework to time-dependent supply chains with inventories and to account for fairness issues.
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